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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
While the research reported in this paper does provide 
a method for predicting United States farm real estate price 
variation, its primary purpose is to examine a more signifi­
cant problem—the substitutability between real and monetary * 
assets in portfolio adjustments and the implications of such 
substitution toward the potential strength of monetary pol­
icy in affecting aggregate income. 
Historical Background 
The classical system with its full-employment equi­
librium under flexible prices really left no room for mone­
tary policy in affecting aggregate income. Keynes' General 
Theory (1936) attacked the full-employment nature of the 
classical system, but more importantly, he attacked the 
classical separation of monetary and value theory. This 
separation, causing relative prices to be determined by real 
supply and demand forces and the price level to be deter­
mined by the quantity of money and its velocity, became 
known as the "classical dichotomy" after Patinkin (1949), 
who later (1954) included real balances in the demand for 
money to "validate" the dichotomy. 
The Keynesian system treated money as simply another 
asset after Hicks' "suggestion" (1935) for a marginalist 
2 
approach to monetary theory. Pigou had already 
described the utility of money for such an approach when 
he imputed to money a rate of return varying inversely to 
money holdings relative to transactions needs and the wealth 
of the holder/ but the Cambridge theorists seemingly ig­
nored his ideas in setting their demand for money as a 
constant proportion of income, leading, of course, to the 
criticism of "a variable unprotected by functional nota­
tion" (Friedman, 1955). After the Keynesian revolution and 
the ensuing debate on the internal consistency (valid ver­
sus invalid dichotomy) of the classical model, Pigou (1943) 
again called for a recognition of the role of wealth in the 
demand for money claiming that such recognition would re­
store the consistency of the classical model. Thus, the 
"Pigou effect" linked the theory of value into monetary 
theory. 
The Keynesian System 
The critical assumptions of the Keynesian systan from 
a monetary standpoint are the low interest elasticity of 
investment and the high interest elasticity of the demand 
for money (at least at low rates). The ultimate policy 
conclusions of the Keynesian model can be shown to rest on 
these critical assumptions by examining the following sim­
ple, linearized Keynesian model: 
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let 
Y = aggregate income 
C = consumption 
I = investment 
S = saving 
T = taxes 
G = government expenditures, exogenously determined 
r = the rate of interest 
= the demand for money 
M® = the supply of money, exogenously determined 
^o'^l'Yo'Yl'^o'^^/Po'Pl ~ positive constants, 
then, 
Y = C+I+G (1.1) 
Y = C+S+T (1.2) 
S = -aQ+a^(Y-T) (1.3) 
T = Yo+Yi(Y) (1.4) 
I = \Q-Xj^(r) (1.5) 
= §o(Y)-Pi(r) (1.5) 
. (1.7) 
While simple, this model nonetheless retains the essential 
characteristics of the Keynesian system: saving is a 
function of disposable income, the rate of interest is 
determined by the supply and demand for money, there is a 
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transactions demand [^^(Y)] and a speculative demand 
[-p^(r)] for money. 
One can solve Equations 1.6 and 1.7 for the rate of 
interest and then solve the system for aggregate income. 
The reduced form of the model in Y is: 
where 0 = ~ ^ iTi Yi^ • Clearly, as approaches 
infinity and/or approaches zero the stronger would be the 
strength of fiscal over monetary policy to affect aggregate 
income. By Keynes' assumptions/ is relatively high and 
^2 is relatively low, hence government expenditures exert a 
more powerful force on income than do changes in the supply 
of money. 
Since the Keynesian revolution in economic theory, 
economists have held that ideally monetary policy should be 
used as a "fine tuning" mechanism in correcting minor de­
viations of the actual from the desired growth path. The 
structural setting in which monetary policy should be used 
is determined by fiscal policy. The reasons cited for such 
a "division of duties" are the ability of the monetary 
authorities to respond to economic deviations much more 
quickly than congressional or legislative bodies, the more 
general impact of monetary policy relative to the specialized 
or discriminatory impact of fiscal policy, and the relative 
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weakness of monetary versus fiscal policy. These reasons 
for maintaining monetary policy as a "fine tuning" mechanism 
have, of course, come under attack fran the "monetarist" 
economists, specifically questioning the ultimate effect of 
monetary policy on economic activity and the length and var­
iability of the "lag in effect" of monetary policy. The 
former controversy is our main concern in this paper; the 
reader is referred -co Friedman (1961) and Tucker (1966) for 
a discussion of the lag in effect of monetary policy. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the strength and relia­
bility of monetary policy hinges upon the degree of substi­
tution between money and financial assets and between fi­
nancial assets and real assets; that is, upon the degree of 
substitution among the different assets that must be de­
scribed in giving a full outline of the monetary mechanism. 
This, in turn, depends upon the variables necessary to de­
scribe the demand for money. 
In support of the high interest elasticity of the de­
mand for money, Keynesian theorists would argue that only a 
narrowly defined group of financial assets are close sub­
stitutes for money balances; thus, a change in the money 
supply would be expected to have a small effect on interest 
rates on substitute financial assets because a small dif­
ferential in yields between these assets and money would 
cause shifts in asset holdings which would again equalize 
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the yields of money and the substitute financial assets. 
These shifts in asset holdings would be confined, primarily, 
to the holdings of money and the financial assets held as 
close substitutes for money. A change in the supply of money 
would cause relatively minor changes in the interest rates on 
financial assets, and these interest rate changes would cause 
an offsetting change in the quantity of money demanded. 
Changes in the money supply, then, would indirectly affect 
expenditures through changes in the interest rates on money 
substitutes, narrowly defined; but the expenditures effect 
would be small because the interest rate changes on finan­
cial substitutes for money would be small and the elasticity 
of expenditures with respect to such interest rate changes 
is low. 
If, however, a wide range of assets, financial and real, 
are viewed as substitutes for money, then a change in the 
supply of money would have a direct effect upon expenditures 
as people adjust their holdings of real assets. Secondly, 
the changed interest rates on financial assets brought about 
through open-market operations would not cause an offsetting 
change in the demand for money which would change the ratio 
of money holdings to incomes, but rather, the return to 
equilibrium would be through changed demands for a wide 
range of real and financial assets. Thus, a change in the 
money supply would not be fully absorbed into the demand for 
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money but would cause portfolio adjustments in real asset 
holdings (expenditures). This argument—the higher elastic­
ity of e3«penditure on real assets and lower elasticity of 
the demand for money with respect to interest rate changes 
on financial asset substitutes—is a primary theoretical 
contention of the "monetarist" school of thought. 
The Tobin Contribution 
In the strict interpretation of the Keynesian adjust­
ment mechanism, bonds, i.e., government debt, were the only 
substitute for money holdings. While the works of 
Haberler (1941) and Pigou (1943) had introduced 
wealth as a factor in the demand for money, its signifi­
cance in a portfolio sense was based on a theory of optimal 
inventory holdings. Baumol (1952) applied the theory to 
inventories of money and finally related the demand for 
money to the volume of nonfinancial transactions and to 
yields on alternative assets. This was an early introduc­
tion to the portfolio selection approach to the demand for 
money and a return to the liquidity preference ideas put 
forth by Hicks much earlier. These ideas were more formally 
written, then, by Markowitz (1959) and James Tobin (1958, 
1965). 
The portfolio approach to monetary adjustments has been 
erroneously cited as the distinguishing factor between the 
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Keynesian and the monetarist or neoquantity economists. 
But clearly Keynes allowed for changes in the portfolio 
holdings of bonds and the effects of other asset holdings 
on the demand for bonds. Likewise,Friedman (1956, 1970), 
as the major exponent of the neo-quantity approach, allows 
for a portfolio adjustment process in response to wealth 
effects of monetary policy. The real distinction between 
the two is their differing views on the asset money. In 
Friedman's view, money is simply another way of holding 
value or purchasing power, and money has a comparative ad­
vantage in fulfilling transactions needs. Hence, it fits 
into the portfolio as an asset whose primary yield is con­
venience in transactions. Keynes, on the other hand, gives 
much more weight to the comparative advantage of money. 
Keynes holds money to be, in a portfolio sense, fulfilling a 
different role from all other assets except perhaps bonds; 
money, then, is more unique, in having fewer substitutes, 
in a Keynesian framework. 
The Theoretical Issue 
The test of the strength and reliability of monetary 
policy, then, lies in the range of assets considered to be 
substitutes for money holdings and in the degree of substi­
tution between these assets in the portfolio. One can think 
of all asset holdings as part of a portfolio, but only a 
9 
portion thereof as being substitutes in a financial port­
folio sense. If the range of substitutes is very wide, 
encompassing at the limit the entire portfolio/ then the 
degree of substitution along the spectrum from financial to 
real assets would be low; then the interest rate changes 
brought about by the monetary authorities would be quite 
large, and the effects of such interest rate changes on 
aggregate income would be stronger insofar as an increase 
in the money supply will be absorbed into money holdings to 
a lesser extent than if the range of money substitutes was 
narrow and the degree of substitution between money and such 
substitutes was high. 
To clarify the issue, I propose the following example 
of the Keynesian monetary mechanism as altered by Tobin. 
Suppose the monetary authorities increase the supply of 
money (M®) through open market purchases of public debt. 
These purchases cause a disequilibrium in the money market; 
the supply of money exceeds the demand for money (M^). In 
response to the excess of actual over desired money balances, 
households seek to restore the equilibrium by reducing money 
holdings because the cost of holding the excess money (not 
using the money for purchases of other assets and their 
foregone earnings) outweighs its return (convenience for 
transactions). 
Now the households can reduce cash balances in many ways. 
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They can, for instance, purchase bonds, other financial 
assets, real assets, or consumer goods. From a utility 
maximization standpoint, we might expect that households 
initially adjust their expenditures on very close substi­
tutes for money; i.e., bonds. Likewise, from a portfolio 
analysis we might expect the excess money to be spent on 
bonds because, after all, this is the asset which has an 
excess demand due to the open market purchases. In fact, 
Friedman himself would likely view bonds as the first step 
in disposing of excess money balances; he would not feel 
restricted to bonds, however. In our portfolio analysis, 
Keynes would argue that only a few financial assets are 
viewed by households as close substitutes for money, and 
the substitutabi 1 ity of bonds for money is very strong be­
cause of the comparability of liquidity, risk, and yield. 
Thus, at least initially, the nod is given to purchase more 
bonds causing the price of bonds (P^^) to be driven up and 
the rate of return on bonds (r^), viewing bonds as consols 
with fixed money return coupons attached, to be driven down. 
As the rate of return on bonds declines, the demand for 
money would increase because cash is now relatively less 
costly to hold than before. This increase in the quantity 
of money demanded could be fully compensating of the excess 
supply of money if the interest elasticity of the demand for 
money were infinite. An infinite interest rate elasticity 
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would, of course, mean that monetary policy would be totally 
ineffective because any change in the supply of money would 
have no effect on aggregate income; the excess money would 
be absorbed into money holdings. Eirqpirical evidence on the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money, however, is 
conclusive that the elasticity is not - <» but most likely in 
the range -.2 to -1.0. (Some studies on the interest elas­
ticity of the demand for money are reviewed in Appendix I of 
Goodhart and Crockett, 1970). 
If the increase in the demand for money was not fully 
balancing, then we must introduce further substitution in 
the portfolio balancing process and aggregate income (Y) 
will be affected to some degree. In a typical Tobin fash­
ion, we could say that the reduction in bond yields caused 
equities (E) to become relatively more attractive, and thus, 
more equities were demanded causing the price of equities 
(Pg) to increase and the rate of return on equities (r^) to 
decline. The decline in the rate of return on equities or 
the cost of capital would induce investment (I) and increase 
income. 
The increased income would now cause the demand for 
money to increase directly and indirectly, insofar as in­
creased inccane would cause increased consuir^tion, and this 
increased consultation would cause income to again increase 
in a multiplier fashion. 
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This mechanism diagrammatically appears as: 
M^t _+ (M^ > 
I 
: 
(?%) r 
(r^)^ ^e"^ -*• MEC"^ -+ 
where: 
= money supply 
= money demand 
r^ = rate of return on bonds 
r^ = rate of return on equities 
Pg = price of equities 
MEC = marginal efficiency of capital 
I = investment 
C = consumption 
Y = aggregate income. 
Or, in general, we could say that the money mechanism calls 
for a readjustment of portfolio holdings by purchasing money 
substitutes along a spectrum of decreasing substitutability, 
where the purchase of each asset leads to an increase in the 
price and a decline in the rate of return on that asset. 
Yt 
i  
Ct Yt 
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The substitution finally causes the return on capital to 
exceed the cost of capital and induces investment. 
More recent literature (Tobin, 1959) has focused on the 
details of the mechanism whereby a discrepancy between the 
rate of return on equities (r^) and the return on capital 
(MEC) stimulates investment. A brief description is pre­
sented. 
An increase in the stock of money has several port­
folio effects. The first effect is to reduce the "in-kind" 
yield of money holdings because cash balances are, ceteris 
paribus, larger than required for transactions balances. 
Secondly, the larger is the proportion of total wealth held 
in the form of any single asset, the greater is the risk, 
and lower the utility, of possible losses due to price 
changes. Thus, the yield on cash balances relative to the 
yield on other asset holdings, say capital, decreases. The 
discrepancy between the yield on money holdings and the 
yield on capital causes the price of existing capital to be bid 
up and narrows the price differential between new capital 
and existing capital thus stimulating investment. The im­
portant point is that we should expect the prices of exist­
ing capital goods, whether directly affected by money— 
capital portfolio shifts, or indirectly via bond-equity-
capital portfolio shifts, to increase with increases in the 
supply of money. 
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This rather direct effect upon the price of existing 
capital and the ensuing increase in the rate of investment 
resulting from an increase in the supply of money can be 
envisioned as: 
where: 
r^ ~ the yield on money holdings 
r^ 5 the yield on capital 
= the price of existing capital 
H the price of new capital 
I = investment. 
Testing Possibilities and Previous Tests 
The economic problem, from a policy standpoint, is to 
determine the degree of substitution among portfolio assets 
in order to assess the importance of control over the money 
stock. The common method of estimating such substitution 
relationships is to evaluate the cross-elasticity of demand 
between the assets in question; i.e., to estimate, over time, 
the percentage change in the quantities demanded of the two 
assets in response to various percentage changes in the rel­
ative prices (rate of interest). The most common test of 
the importance of money.- then, has been to measure the degree 
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of responsiveness of money balances to changes in the in­
terest rates on other financial assets considered to be close 
substitutes for money balances. Some of these tests of the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money are summarized 
in T^pendix B. This testing procedure may be considered a 
direct test insofar as the dependent variable is the demand 
for money balances. 
A second testing procedure less direct insofar as the 
test measures the substitut ability between two nonmoney 
assets in the portfolio has almost been ignored in relative 
frequency to primary tests. This type of test has the ad­
vantage of avoiding several of the theoretical arguments 
inherent to primary tests; for instance, whether the money 
balances should be narrowly or broadly defined. On the 
other hand, new questions arise concerning which assets 
should be considered substitutes; but on balance, the in­
direct testing procedure must be considered at least as 
reliable as the direct procedure for the following reasons: 
a) Any valid substitution relationship detected is 
meaningful because, after all, all goods in a port­
folio are to some extent substitutes. 
b) There seems to be some general agreement on the 
fact that monetary policy will have rather im­
mediate initial effects in the markets for financial 
assets. Hence, a strong substitution between such 
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financial assets and real assets would indicate a 
potentially major role for monetary policy because 
monetary authorities can affect financial markets. 
c) The monetary effects on income, it is agreed, are 
transmitted through attempts to balance the port­
folio rates of return at the margin, and monetary 
policy affects both the return on money and fi­
nancial assets; i.e., interest rate transmissions. 
d) Most economists are agreed that the strength of 
monetary policy depends upon the degree of substi­
tution between financial assets and real assets. 
Thus, an indirect test relative to the effect of 
portfolio substitutions on money balances is 
really a direct test of the economic question— 
the strength of monetary policy. 
Why Land? 
In a portfolio analysis framework, one test of the ef­
fectiveness of monetary policy in the transmission mechanism 
presented is the extent to which substitution among portfolio 
assets, in response to a change in interest rates brought 
about through open-market operations, affects the cost of 
capital. Tobin (1965) enphasizes relative yields and rela­
tive risks among assets as primary factors determining the 
extent of substitution among assets in a portfolio. 
17 
The portfolio problem is really one of maximizing a 
portfolio yield subject to risk constraints. We could state 
the objective function as: 
Y= + XgYg + ... + X^Y^ 
where Y is the total portfolio yield, Y^ is the yield of the 
i^^ asset in the portfolio, and Xj^ is the proportion of the 
•f"*h portfolio held in the i asset. The measure of risk reccxn-
mended by Tobin is the standard deviation (cr) of the yield 
series; thus, the risk constraint could be written: 
4-2 .3 . . . r ,  =  44*44* 
+ 2X^X^p^,^a^(i^+ ... + 2X^X^_iP n. n-l^n^n-1 
where p^ is the correlation coefficient between the yields 
on asset i and asset j, and, of course, the final constraint 
requires the sum of the X^ to equal one (1). 
In this context, the substitution between nonmoney 
financial assets and real assets is the most important sub­
stitution relationship for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Agricultural land is one form of capital that may 
be considered closely substitutable for the financial assets 
bonds and equities based upon the similarities in risk and 
yield of the assets. 
Intuitively, land seems to be an investment of relatively 
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low risk, like bonds, when one considers the appreciation 
record of land. Since 1940, the average value of land per 
acre for the United States was decreased in only three years. 
More recent experience shows the price of land increasing 
from $69 per acre in 1950 to $195 per acre in 1970. And, 
while land holdings are less liquid and divisible than bond 
holdings, it can be viewed as an investment of long-term 
nature; i.e., similarity in investment duration. It may 
be noted that the rise of corporate farming makes land in­
vestments more liquid and divisible in organized exchanges. 
This development allows the cost of capital in agriculture 
to be affected by the monetary authorities in exactly the 
same manner as it is affected, as envisioned by Tobin, and 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), in other industries through 
corporation finance decisions. 
Tobin's "General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary 
Theory" (1969) gives another justification for including 
the bond return in the demand for farm real estate. Tobin 
argues that, in a general equilibrium framework, all of the 
interest rates relevant to the assets in a portfolio must 
appear in the demand function of each asset in the port­
folio because the total change of asset holdings in the 
portfolio, in response to a change in a particular interest 
rate, must be zero. For this reason, Tobin argues that an 
insignificant effect of a particular interest rate change 
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upon another portfolio asset doesn't mean that the interest 
rate in question should be omitted because the effects may 
be distributed in such a manner that they seem individually 
insignificant but have significant effects on the total 
portfolio holdings. 
A final reason for using land in testing the effects 
of monetary policy relates to the substitutability of land 
and capital. The mechanism envisioned to describe the ef­
fects of monetary policy requires changes in the price of 
capital. From an empirical testing standpoint, we are lost 
as to what series of data should be used for the price of 
capital. Insofar as agricultural land is a substitute for, 
indeed one form of, physical capital, land prices may be 
used as a proxy for the price of existing capital. This 
paper includes a simple model in which the price of land is 
used in such a manner, and the results of this test are in­
cluded in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER II. THE DEMAND FOR FARM REAL ESTATE 
This chapter develops two models of the demand for farm 
real estate in the United States. The first is a simple, 
single equation model reflecting the demand for agricultural 
land as a portfolio asset, and this model is suitable for 
testing the elasticity of the price of farm land with re­
spect to interest rate variations on competing assets, again 
in a Tobin portfolio sense. The second model is a three 
market portfolio-type model patterned after the asset market 
model of Foley and Sidrauski (1971) and Tobin (1969). 
Model I—Land as a Competitive Asset 
Average land prices in the United States have increased 
near 300 percent since 1950 while average farm incomes have 
increased by less than 100 percent. This evidence casts 
some doubt on the hypothesis that the demand for land is 
primarily a function of its rate of return. Clearly, if 
net farm income is used as a proxy for the residual rate of 
return imputed to land, it does not explain the increases in 
land prices since 1950. 
A popular alternative hypothesis suggested by some ag­
ricultural economists is that the price increases are a re­
sult of an excess demand for farm land in farm enlargement 
programs. This hypothesis is based, in part, on the fact 
that regressions of land price on net income from farming 
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gave fairly good statistical fits prior to 1952, but after 
that time, changes in net income or increased nominal yields 
to land holders failed to explain the land price spiral. In 
response to these findings, the farm enlargement hypothesis 
stated that farmers were clamoring for land as a nonconrpeting 
asset, that is, without regard to the yield on land or the 
yield on land relative to the yield on other assets. 
Other hypotheses could be advanced relating the price 
of agricultural land to such factors as the machinery stock; 
cropping practices; the location of the land; quality of 
access roads; capitalized benefits of farm programs tied to 
acreage restrictions; land taxes; the supply of farm labor; 
speculation on anticipated appreciation in land values; pop­
ulation growth; the number of farms; the number of nonoper-
ator farm owners; the farm financial structure, such as the 
ratio of farm real estate debt to equity, the quantity of 
farm liquid assets, and the proportion of farm real estate 
debt held by various lenders; and the return available on 
competing assets. 
The portfolio hypothesis of the determination of land 
price variations proposed in Model I is exactly opposite 
the farm enlargement hypothesis in treating farm land as a 
competing asset with other forms of investment. It seems 
economically unlikely that farm investors, operator or non-
operator, purchase land without regard to its yield, as well 
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as competitive yields, in an investment portfolio. One 
could argue that since 1952 the role of competitive assets 
in the determination of land values has increased, and this 
helps to explain why the yield on farm land has failed to 
explain land price variations. 
From the aforementioned list of variables affecting 
the price of farm real estate, the most relevant in a port­
folio analysis are the yield on land; the anticipated ap­
preciation in land values, i.e., the expected capital gains 
from holding land; and the yield on competitive assets. We 
could simply state that: 
P = f(Y, CG, R) (2.1) 
where 
P = the price of farm real estate 
Y = a measure of the yield on land 
CG = a measure of the capital gains, expected or 
realized, from holding land; and 
R = some measure of the return on assets competitive 
to farm real estate as an investment. 
More of the listed variables could be included in a 
more coit^lex model of several equations estimated recursively. 
The simplicity of the above model lies in having only pre­
sumably exogenous variables to a single dependent variable 
making ordinary least-squares appropriate for estimation. 
The model may, in fact, appear too single for prediction 
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purposes insofar as it considers only one-half of the market 
for farm land, the demand/ and it neglects supply factors. 
The sin^licity gained, however, seems to outweigh any loss 
of accuracy in prediction on this count because for any 
given year the supply of land can be considered fixed. Ob­
viously, the supply of agricultural land changes over time 
through clearing and irrigation projects, changes in govern­
ment farm programs, and urbanization and industrialization, 
but the effects of such changes on the total supply of farm 
real estate are expected to be negligible. 
Alternative Specifications 
The demand function may be specified in several ways 
depending upon the specific measures used to represent the 
various effects and the assumed mathematical properties of 
the function itself. 
There are several measures for the yield from holding 
farm real estate, each with its own merits. Gross farm in­
come, for exançîle, is a commonly used proxy for the residual 
return to land, but an average of gross farm incomes over 
the current and several previous periods could also be used 
on the assun^tion that investors are more concerned with the 
mean return or the expected return than the more variable re­
turn of a given year. Another commonly used series for the 
yield on agricultural land is the gross farm income of the 
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previous year. The rationale for this lag lies in the tim­
ing of data reporting on the price of land and the realiza­
tion of farm income. Land values are recorded as of March 
1st each year and farm incOTie is reported on Deconber 31st. 
Thus, the most direct effect that farm income could have on 
land values is with a one-year lag. 
The general demand function (2.1) was fitted in linear 
form for specified periods with the following variations in 
data representing the yield on farm real estate: the resid­
ual dollar yield to farm real estate ($RY) calculated as the 
residual of net farm income in return to farm real estate 
after imputing returns to production labor, operator's man­
agement, and nonreal estate farm capital; a simple three-
year average of the residual dollar yield to farm real estate 
of the current and two previous periods ( $RY* ), gross farm in­
come per acre (GFY), and a three-year simple average of the 
gross farm income per acre over the current and two previous 
years (GFY*). (See Appendix for sources and description of 
data.) We should, of course, expect the price of farm real 
estate to vary directly with the yield on farm real estate. 
The price of farm real estate is expected to vary di­
rectly with the expected appreciation in land values, that 
is, with the capital gains from holding farm real estate. 
One procedure for building expectations into a model is to 
make the expected value of CG a weighted average of current 
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and past values of that variable. The weights may be es­
tablished as values of some polynomial of given degree or 
arbitrarily chosen (see Tweeten and Martin, 1955). Or, the 
present and past values of the independent variables may be 
treated separately allowing the coefficients to be estab­
lished by least-squares. 
The measures for the capital gains variable in fitting 
the linear demand for farm real estate were: the current 
year's capital gain (CG^) calculated simply as the change 
in the price of farm real estate (measured in current dol­
lars) frcan the previous year, the capital gain over the cur­
rent year and the two previous years, and a single three-
year average of capital gains over the current and two pre­
vious years 
CG_ + CG_ T + GC. _ 
( C G *  =  — ^ ^  ^ )  
The price of land should vary inversely with the yield 
on competitive assets. In maximizing the total utility from 
an investment portfolio, we expect the investor to equate 
the marginal utility of the last dollar invested plus the 
marginal disutility of risk associated with that investment 
for all assets in the portfolio (see Floyd, 1972). Con­
sidering farm real estate and one other competitive asset, 
we should expect that portfolio shifts will be undertaken 
until the marginal utility from income of land relative to 
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the marginal disutility of risk associated with land hold­
ings is equal to the marginal utility of income fran the 
competitive asset relative to the marginal disutility of 
risk of holding that asset. Thus, an increase in the re­
turn on competitive assets should cause investors to shift 
into those assets until the marginal conditions are re­
stored. This means that either the dollar yield on farm 
real estate must increase, or alternatively, the price of 
farm land must decrease, in order to increase the rate of 
return on farm real estate. 
Perfect substitutability between farm land and, say, 
equities, in the absence of transactions costs and imper­
fect information, would inç>ly that the elasticity of farm 
real estate values with respect to the rate of return on 
equities should be -1.0, that is, if the return on equities 
increases, the price of farm land (dollar yield constant) 
must undergo an equal percentage reduction. For R, the 
yield on competitive assets, the linear model was fitted 
with Standard and Poor's corporate divident/price ratio. 
As a second test of the elasticity of farm real estate 
values with respect to the independent variables and to 
allow for a more flexible mathematical specification, the 
model was respecified in log-linear form as: 
In P -- + In Y + InCG + a^ In R+e (2-2) 
27 
where the are least-squares coefficients interpreted, 
of course, as elasticities and e is the error term. The 
results of both the linear and log-linear specifications 
are reported in Chapter III. 
Model II—Land as a Proxy for Capital 
One other model was suggested for testing the possi­
bility of using the rate of return on farm real estate as 
a proxy for the return to capital in a macroeconomic model. 
The model presented here is a single three market variant 
of the Tobin (1969) and Foley and Sidrauski (1971) type where 
the effects of monetary policy are transmitted through the 
price of capital affecting the equilibrium in the assets 
markets. 
The three markets in this model are the markets for 
money (M), bonds (B) and capital (K). Wealth, measured in 
current commodity prices may then be written: 
where 
K - the real stock of capital, fixed at any point in 
time through past savings and capital accumula­
tion decisions 
B = the stock of privately held interest-bearing 
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government debt, fixed at any point in time as 
the result of past government deficits; and 
M = the monetary base. Commercial and mutual savings 
banks are "inside" this system as one type of 
private investor; thus, B includes interest-
bearing public debt securities held by banks and 
M is "high-powered money. " This makes M the sup­
ply of money to the private sector inclusive of 
banks. 
Pk = average market value of a unit of capital held 
by the private sector, 
Pb = average market price of a unit of government 
debt (bond) held by the private sector. 
At any point in time, the quantities of money, bonds, 
and capital demanded in the portfolios o£ wealth owners de­
pend on their wealth (W), the vector of real rates of return 
on money, bonds, and capital (p^'Pb'Pk^ and the aggregate 
level of income of the wealth owners measured in real terms 
(Y). 
The demand functions for the three assets could be 
written then as; 
»d 
-p- = (2.4) 
gdp 
p ^  = f2^^'Pm'Pb'Pk'^^ (2.5) 
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(2 .6)  
P 
Assume that an increase in the level of real income in­
creases the demand for money (a transactions demand) at 
the expense of both bonds and capital, i.e.. 
and an increase in real wealth increases the demand for all 
assets, i.e., 
ôfi 
> 0 for all i=l,2/3 
Further, we expect that an increase in own real rate of 
return increases the demand for that asset at the expense 
of the other two, that is, the assets are assumed to be 
gross substitutes. 
From the wealth constraint (2.3) the demand function 
partials are further restricted such that 
/ 
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The demand functions for the three assets could now be 
written in linear form as: 
wd 
•p" = ^o (^1^+ ^SPb"^ ^4Pk'*' ^ 5^ (2-7) 
p = ^1^"*" ^SPb"*" ^ 4Pk'^ ^ 5^ (2.8) 
A 
-p^ = To + + TzPm + TsP b + T4Pk + Ts^ ' ^2.9) 
where the vector of real rate-of-retvirn equations are: 
Pm " ''m - ^  ' '2-"' 
Pb = r ' - T ' (2.11) 
Ap 
Pk " "pT " T ' (2.12) 
where 
r^ = the nominal return from a unit of money, in­
stitutionally zero, 
^k ~ the "rental rate" of a unit of capital, equal 
to the value of the marginal product of capital 
relative to the price of capital, 
Ap ^
 = the expected rate of change in commodity prices. 
31 
r, = the nominal rate of return on bonds 
assumed to have a fixed nominal yield. 
^b. 
fk 
P, 
the rate of change in r^. 
the rate of change in P^/ and 
f is a function such that f > 0 
The nominal return on money is zero, but there is still 
the possibility of capital gains and losses on money hold­
ings due to changes in the price level, increases in the 
general level of prices reduce the purchasing power of money 
holdings and, hence, the real rate of return on money. Equa­
tion 2.11 expresses the fact that bond holders recognize de­
creases in the real rate of return on bonds from the nominal 
rate when the nominal rate increases because increases in r^ 
result in capital losses due to decreases in P^. And, like 
money, bonds suffer a reduction in real yield when the pur­
chasing power of the nominal return is decreased by infla­
tion. Finally, the real rate of return on capital depends 
upon the rental rate, changes in the purchasing power of 
the rental income, and capital gains or losses due to 
changes in P^. 
Substituting Equations 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 into Equa­
tions 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 we have four equations (three real 
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daaand functions plus the wealth constraint) and three un­
knowns; 
id and P / P ' P * 
But only three of the four equations are independent because 
given any two of the demands, the third can be found from 
the wealth constraint. We could, then, eliminate any one 
of the demand functions, say, the demand for capital. Thus, 
we have three independent equations (2.3, 2.7, and 2.8) in 
three unknowns 
,4 , . 
Substituting for and and arranging terms, the solution 
for r]^ is: 
-("3P5 
^k = 5 + E -p-
«3(1-^5) + P3CC5 Psfl'GgPi _ 
+ 5 p— + ffi Y 
^3-5 "*^3^5 ^^k ^^k , n , °^3-^2 ~-^3^2-, AP 
5 p- - + i ' -p- ' 
(2.13) 
where <5 = ^3^4 " 4^ 3 ® positive constant since < 0, 
< 0, < 0, and ^3 > 0. Assuming that and Pg are 
greater than zero but less than one, the signs of the 
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coefficients are indeterminate for 
, Y , ana f 
The sign for 
is positive/ and the sign for 
is negative. 
The hypothesis is that the rate-of-return on farm real 
estate and variations in that rate should be a good proxy 
for the rate-of-return on capital. Hie support for this 
hypothesis rests in the expected investment competition be­
tween land and other forms of capital and in the importance 
of land as one form of capital. 
Substituting, then, the price of farm real estate, the 
rate of return on farm real estate, and the rate of change 
in farm real estate prices for the price of capital, the 
rate of return on capital, and the rate of change in capital 
prices (2.13) becomes; 
= 5 + Ï P" 
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+ 
03(1-^5^ ^3^5 _j_ ^3*^1 "^3^1 
S P » 
+ 
Pgdg — A^T AQ 
L 
(2.14) 
where the expected signs are the same as before. 
Now letting the income from farm real estate relative 
to the price of farm real estate be r^, we have a model 
suitable for testing the use of farm land as a proxy for 
capital. 
We assume, of course, that at any point in time the 
demand for each asset is equal to its observed supply so 
that 
(2.15) 
B ,d B s and (2.16) 
K .d K' s (2.17) 
These substitutions into Equation 2.14 allow us to work 
with observable quantities. 
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CHAPTER Ilia EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Model I 
The empirical results from model I shed sane light on 
the degree of substitution between farm real estate as one 
form of real investment expenditures and financial assets. 
The importance of this type of substitution is, again, that 
if the substitution between financial assets and real assets 
is relatively strong this suggests that the return to equlib-
rium in response to a change in the supply of money is not 
confined to financial markets, but rather the return to equi­
librium is through changed demands for a much wider range 
of financial and real assets. Such a substitution relation­
ship implies, then, that a change in the money supply has a 
direct effect, a portfolio effect, upon expenditures, and 
further, that the expenditures on real assets are quite sen­
sitive with respect -Lo interest rate changes on financial 
assets. This is, of course, the "monetarist" contention 
which is contrary to the strict interpretation of Keynesian 
theory. 
The results from fitting model I in linear form for 
the post-war period by ordinary least squares are presented 
in Tables 3.1 to 3.4. 
These results suggest that the yield on farm real estate, 
as proxied by either the residual dollar yield on land or 
Table 3.1 Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f($RY^_^, CG^, CGt_2, ^t-2' 1952-70 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant S™t-l CGt CGt-1 (:Gt_2 
3.1.1 60.484 13.704 
(3.333)** 
3.1.2 60.734 10.250 
(2.251)* 
2.477 
(1.106) 
3.1.3 133.68 3.614 
(1.253) 
2.620 
(2.091) 
1.339 
(1.334) 
2.807 
(2.768)* 
figures in parentheses are t-statistics. This is true 
for the following tables also. 
Significant at .01 level. This is true for the fol­
lowing tables also. 
* 
Significant at .05 level. This is true for the fol­
lowing tables also. 
Table 3.2. Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f($Ry*, CG^, ^*^t-2' ^^^^1952-70 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant $RY* CG^ CG^ ^ ^t-2 
3.2.1 38.912 19.164 
(6.512)** 
3.2.2 43.054 14.525 2.771 
(3.659)** (1.652) 
3.2.3 119.04 8.875 2.095 0.342 2.185 
(2.230)* (1.448) (0.259) (2.125)* 
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D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
$R^t_l 
r2 Durbin-
Watson d 
0.511 0.484 0.554 
0.383 0.518 0.542 
-17.151 
(-4.669)** 
-0.536 0.135 0.899 1.092 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
$RY* 
R2 Durbin-
Watson d 
0.692 0.706 0.330 
0.524 0.757 0.522 
-16.153 
(-3.379)** 
-0.480 0.320 0.903 0.669 
Table 3.3. Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P - f(GFY^_i, CG^, ^®t-l' °^t-2' ^ ^^^1952-70 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant GFYt_l CGt GGt_l ' ^t-2 
3.3.1 -66.614 5.252 
(15.895)** 
3.3.2 252.23 
3.3.3 -57.303 4.826 
(9.813)** 
1.103 
(1.186) 
3.3.4 -62.268 5.082 
(9.439)** 
1.374 
(1.441) ( 
-0.972 
-1.122) 
3.3.5 0.864 4.325 
(9.616)** 
0.494 
(0.662) 
0.231 
(0.320) 
3.3.6 9.669 3.932 
(6.751)** 
0.860 
(1.048) 
0.210 
(0.292) 
0.653 
(1.057) 
Table 3.4. Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f(GFY*, CG. , CG^ 1, CG^ 
-70 
Independent Variables a 
Equation Constant GFY* CGt CGt_l CGt_2 
3.4.1 -70.515 5.384 
(23.532)** 
3.4.2 -22.885 4.854 
(26.969)** 
3.4.3 -61.012 4.920 
(16.221)** 
1.202 
(2.107)* 
3.4.4 -65.379 5.151 
(16.681)** 
1.502 
(2.704)** 
-0.945 
(-1.852) 
3.4.5 -20.858 4.582 
(18.795)** 
0.934 
(2.372)* 
-0.988 
(-0.252) 
3.4.6 -16.486 4.410 
(13.502)** 
1.070 
(2.470* 
-1.000 
(-0.249) 
0.277 
(0.803) 
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D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
R2 Durbin-
Watson d 
1.527 0.841 0.814 
-31.007 
(-3.859)** 
-0.722 0.466 0.267 
1.401 0.941 0.983 
1.475 0.943 1.414 
-10.012 
(-3.646)** 
-0.298 1.255 0.971 1.583 
-10.084 -0.300 1.141 0.975 1.676 
(-3.687)** 
D/P 
2 Mean Mean F Durbin-
Elasticity Elasticity Watson d 
P-w.r.t P w.ir.t. 
h)/P GEY* 
1.560 0.970 0.400 
-7.551 -0.225 1.406 0.986 0.886 
(-5.053)** 
1.425 0.976 0.450 
1.492 0.980 0.960 
-6.812 -0.203 1.327 0.992 0.913 
(-4.407)** 
-6.950 -0.207 1.277 0.992 0.947 
(-4.413)** 
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gross farm income per acre of farm real estate, is signifi­
cant. in explaining farm real estate price variations in the 
post-war period. This finding is consistent with the hy­
pothesis of model I, that farm land is an investment-
con^jetitive asset. The yield on farm land is significant 
in thirteen of fourteen regressions and always has the ex­
pected positive sign. 
The mean elasticity of the price, of farm real estate 
with respect to the residual dollar yield on land or its 
expectation as proxied by the average residual dollar yield 
is always less than 0.5, while the price elasticity with 
respect to gross farm income is nearer the expected value 
of 1.0 in all cases and equal to 1.14 for the full model 
with GFY^ ^  and 1.28 for the full model with GFY*. Thus, 
the results using GFY as a proxy for the yield on land ap­
pear to support our hypothesis better than the results re­
ported with $RY as the yield variable. Further, GFY has a 
higher significance than $RY in all specifications, and the 
2 R is higher in regressions using GFY. These facts indi­
cate that gross farm income per acre has more explanatory 
power, as an independent variable, than does the residual 
dollar yield to farm real estate. This is a rather sur­
prising result as we should expect that $RY would more ac­
curately reflect the yield to land than would GFY. The 
most plausible explanation for finding the opposite is that 
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the residual nature of the $RY variable makes it much more 
susceptible to reporting and calculation errors. 
The capital gains variables have the eacpected positive 
sign in all but three cases. In general, however, the cap­
ital gains coefficients were found to be insignificant, and 
the addition of lagged capital gains as independent vari-
ables did not significantly improve the R . In fact, when 
GFY^_^ was used as the yield on land variable, inclusion of 
2 the capital gains of the current period increased the R 
from 0.841 to 0.941, but capital gains of the previous two 
2 periods increased the R by less than one percent. 
A most rewarding result is the expected negative sign 
and the high level of significance for the return on com­
petitive assets variable, D/P. This variable was found to 
be significant at the 1 percent confidence level in all 
cases, suggesting that farm real estate is, in fact, com­
petitive with other forms of investment. As previously 
noted, perfect substitution between farm real estate and 
equities would imply that the elasticity of farm real 
estate with respect to the yield on equities should be 
-1.0, and we note that the mean elasticity is always neg­
ative and is in the range -0.30 to -0.50 in the full model 
specifications. A mean price elasticity in this range is 
acceptable when we recognize transactions costs and in­
divisibilities as imperfections and when we note that this 
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is an average elasticity. 
The Durbin-Watson d statistic is inconclusive in test­
ing for first order autocorrelation in the full model spec­
ified with $RY^ GFY^ or GFY* as the yield to farm land 
variable, but we reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
when the full model is specified with $RY* as the land 
yield variable (dL= 0.75). 
To examine the true elasticity of the price of farm real 
estate with respect to the yield on farm real estate and with 
respect to the yield on competitive assets, the model was 
specified in log-linear form. We expect that the rate of 
return on farm real estate should equal the rate of return 
on competitive assets, i.e., 
^ = R , (3.1) 
or alternatively, 
^ ^ = P . (3.2) 
Stated in log-linear form, then, we expect that 
In P = ln(Y+CX3) + In R (3.3) 
This model was tested in actual and expected variables for 
Y and CG and with the dividend to price ratio representing 
the rate of return on competitive assets (R). The results 
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are reported in Table 3.5. Clearly, the yield on land is 
a significant variable in explaining variations in the value 
of farm real estate as this variable always possesses the 
correct a priori sign and is always significant. More im­
portantly, the regression coefficient, is the elasticity 
of the price :t farm real estate with respect to the yield 
on f irm real estate and ag is the elasticity of the price 
of farm real estate with respect to the rate-of-return on 
competitive assets. The expected values of these coeffi­
cients aie 1,0 and -1.0, respectively, and, we note that in 
fact, a. is very close to 1.0 in all cases and a t-test fails 
JL 
to reject the hypothesis that = 1 in all cases. The elas­
ticity of P with respect to D/P (CG), however, is less im­
pressive at about -0.5, but this value is, again, certainly 
within an acceptable range of substitution under the hy­
pothesis of the model. The lower elasticity with respect 
D/P suggests that, while farm real estate is viewed as a 
substitute for equities, investors do not view the two 
assets as perfect substitutes, possibly due to a risk dif­
ferential or transactions costs, or perhaps investors do 
not recognize changes in D/P as being permanent in any one-
year period We note, however, that the corpetitive asset 
coefficient, a2^ is always negative, as expected, and is 
significant at the 1 percent confidence level in all cases. 
The intercept term, a^, can be interpreted as a measure 
Table 3.5. Ordinary least-squares regression of: LnP= f[ln(Y+CG)/ In 70 
Independent Variables* 
Eq. Constant In In In In 
(GFY^_^+CG^) (GFY^_^+CG*) (GFY*+CG^) (GFY*+CG*) 
In D/P R Durbin-
Watson 
d 
3.5.1 -0.166 0.956 
(-0.507) (9.33)** 
-0.423 0.935 1.641 
(-3.67)** 
3.5.2 -0.477 
(-1.73) 
0.937 
(12.17)** 
-0.492 0.958 1.265 » 
(-5.64)** 
3.5.3 -0.191 
(-0.70) 
1.029 
(11.78)** 
-0.348 0.956 1.539 
(-3.58)** 
3.5.4 -0.483 
(-2.19)* 
1.030 -0.437 0.956 0.981 
(15.49)** (-6.11)** 
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of the imperfection of the hypothesized substitution rela­
tion. From Equation 3.3, if the substitution is perfect, 
the expected value of is zero. Thus, a failure to reject 
the null hypothesis = 0 is consistent with the coitç)etitive 
asset hypothesis of model I. Table 3.5 shows a failure to 
reject the hypothesis that = 0 in three of four regres­
sions, the only exception being when the yield on farm land 
is based completely on expectations from the current and 
previous two periods when the expected values of GFY and 
CG are proxied by averages over a three year, weights ar­
bitrarily set at 0.333 for a simple average, some error is 
obviously introduced into the model which may increase the 
significance of a^. 
The failure to reject cc^ = 0 in most regressions sug­
gests, again, that variations in the price of farm land may 
be explained by the yield on farm land and the yield on com­
petitive assets. 
The is 0.935 when the model is tested using actual 
values for all variables and climbs to 0.95 when some form 
of expectation is introduced into the model. This is an 
expected result because while the averaging over actual 
values may introduce specification error, the averaging 
does, nonetheless, reduce the variability in the expected 
variable from that of actual values by "smoothing out" the 
series. 
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The Durbin-Watson d statistic falls in the inconclusive 
range in all four regressions reported, but is acceptable 
at 1.641 when the model is tested with actual value variables, 
i.e., no expectations. The Durbin-Watson falls, of course, 
when expectations are introduced, particularly with a simple 
average of actual values, as the errors become more auto-
correlated. 
In total, these results appear conclusive that the yield 
on land and the rate of return on competitive assets explain 
the variations .in the price of farm real estate in the per­
iod 1952 to 1970. Recognizing the dividend to price ratio 
as the monetary policy variable in this model, that is, as­
suming that iche monetary authorities can affect the demand 
for equities through affecting the yield on bonds, these 
results also suggest a potentially strong effect on expen­
ditures for monetary policy. 
These results, again, support the portfolio hypothesis 
of the demand for farm real estate and are quite destructive 
of the farm enlarganen-c hypothesis. To test the possibility 
of a change in the structure of the demand for farm real 
estate from the pre-1952 period, the same regressions were 
estimated over the period frcm 1939 to 1952. The results 
of these regressions are presented in Tables 3.6 to 3.9. 
The model was not run from 1939-52 with the residual dollar 
yield on land as an independent variable due to a lack of 
Table 3.6. Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f(GFY^_^, CG^, ^®t-l' ^t-2' ^ ^^^1939-52 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant ^^t-l CG^ CG^_2 
3.6.1 5.760 2.186 
(10.951)** 
3.6.2 21.244 
3.6.3 6.017 2.149 0.136 
(8.036)** (0.214) 
3.6.4 3.591 2.390 0.056 -0.738 
(6.768)** (0.087) (-1.042) 
3.6.5 -0.039 2.292 0.162 -0.582 
(5.103)** (0.224) (-0.688) 
3.6.6 3.617 2.861 -0.302 -1.129 -1.261 
(4.908)** (-0.398) (-1.272) (-1.427) 
Table 3.7. Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f(GPY*, CG^, a3^_^, CG^_2, D/P)^939_52 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant GPY* GG, CG- - CG. _ 
"C "C—JL u—Z 
3.7.1 2.866 2.320 
(12.451)** 
3.7.2 2.28 
(11.73)** 
3.7.3 3.310 2.260 0.222 
(9.256)** (0.401) 
3.7.4 2.281 2.361 0.207 -0.332 
(7.523)** (0.361) (-0.542) 
3.7.5 -3.941 2.215 0.360 -0.117 
(5.868)** (0.578) (-0.170) 
3.7.6 -0.526 2.911 -0.16 -0.662 -1.606 
(6.624)** (-0.292) (-1.065) (-2.256) 
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D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
GFYt-1 
R2 Durbin-
Watson d 
0.891 0.908 0.668 
5.819 
(1.044) 
0.597 0.084 0.160 
0.876 0.910 0.634 
0.974 0.918 0.769 
89.212 
(0.380) 
0.091 0.934 0.920 0.119 
-0.782 
(-0.311) 
-0.080 1.166 0.935 1.161 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
GFY* 
R2 Durbin-
Watson d 
0.946 0.927 0.505 
1.31 
(0.81) 
0.134 0.931 0.931 0.545 
0.921 0.929 0.401 
0.962 0.931 0.486 
1.50 
(0.737) 
0.153 0.903 0.936 0.451 
-0.433 
(-0.230) 
-0.044 1.187 0.960 0.843 
Table 3.8, Ordinary least-squares regression of; P = f(GFY*, CG*, 1939.52 
Independent Variables^ Mean Mean Durbin-
Elasticity Elasticity Watson d 
Eq. Constant GPY* CG* D/P P w.r.t P w.r.t. 
D/P GFY* 
3.8.1 -0.965 2.745 -1.650 1.119 0.939 0.950 
(7.891)** (-1.426) 
3.8.2 -3.429 2.283 1.313 0.135 0.931 0.931 0.545 
(11.732)** (0.805) 
3.8.3 -0.564 2.761 -1.701 -0.108 -0.011 1.126 0.939 0.966 
(5.765)** (-1.092) (-0.052) 
Table 3.9. Ordinary least-squares regression of: lnP= f[ln(Y+CX3), In R]ig3g_52 
Independent Variables' 
Eq. Constant In In In In In D/P R' 
(GFY^I+CG^) (GFY^_J+CX3*) (GFY*+CG^) (GPY*+CG*) 
Dur bin-
Watson 
d 
3.9.1 2.553 0.632 
(3.371)**(7.602)** 
0.230 
(1.035) 
0.846 0.583 
2.9.2 2.735 
(4.021)** 
0.654 
(8.744)** 
0.293 
(1.401) 
0.887 0.458 
3.9.3 2.517 
(3.379)** 
0.672 
(8.235)** 
0.244 
(1.084) 
0.869 0.498 
3.9.4 2.591 
(4.052)** 
0.691 0.286 0.903 0.395 
(9.686)** (1.465) 
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data and the previously expressed preference for gross farm 
income, based upon its explanatory power, as the yield on 
land variable. 
The results for the period from 1939-1952 show, again, 
that the yield on farm real estate, as measured by the gross 
farm income per acre of farm real estate or its expectation, 
is highly significant in explaining variations in farm real 
estate prices. This coefficient always has the expected 
positive sign and is always significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent confidence level. Further, the mean 
elasticity of the price of farm real estate with respect to 
the yield on farm land, however measured, is between 0.89 
and 1.17. Any mean elasticity in this range is sufficiently 
close to the expected 1.0 to again support the investment 
nature of land. 
The capital gains variables remain insignificant. 
Addition of three capital gains variables, CG^, CB^ and 
2 CG^_2 increases the R by less than 3 percent when the 
yield on farm land is measured in real values. 
The only obvious change in the structure of the demand 
for farm real estate in this earlier period is the lack of 
significance for the D/P coefficient. In fact, this vari­
able possesses the correct negative sign in only one-third 
of the regressions and the coefficient is never statistically 
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significant. Adding D/P as an independent variable increases 
2 the R by less than one-half of one percent in all cases. 
The Durbin-Watson d statistic indicates autocorrelation 
when GFY* is used to proxy the yield on farm real estate 
and in two of six cases when GFY^_2 is the yield variable. 
This autocorrelation is likely magnified due to the absence 
of a statistically significant negative coefficient in any 
of the regressions. 
These results suggest that farm real estate has become, 
over time, more competitive with equities as an investment. 
This finding may be attributed to the increasing financial 
sophistication of farm operator-owners and to increases in 
nonoperator investments in farm real estate. Table 3.9 
supports these conclusions in testing the log-linear form 
of model I from 1939-1952. 
In this form, we note that, again, the competitive 
asset variable is insignificant while the yield on land 
variable always has the expected a "priori sign and is sig­
nificant at the 1 percent confidence level. T-tests re­
ject the hypotheses that = 0, = 1, and = -1, but 
we note that the elasticity of the price of farm real estate 
with respect to the yield on farm real estate (a^^) has in­
creased over time from about 0.65 in the earlier period to­
ward the expected value of 1.0. This change would also 
support a more sophisticated market for farm real estate 
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over time. 
The results for model I over the entire time period, 
1939-1970, are presented in Tables 3.10-3.13. These re­
sults show the yield on farm real estate as proxied by 
gross farm income per acre or its expectation highly sig­
nificant in explaining variations in the price of farm real 
estate in all regressions. Like the regressions over the 
latter period, 1952-1970, the land yield coefficients are 
in the range 3.5 to 4.5, always possess the expected posi­
tive sign, and are always significant at the 1 percent con­
fidence level. Further, the mean yield elasticity of the 
price of farm real estate is within a reasonable range of 
1.0, falling always between 1.15 and 1.40. 
The capital gains variables, again, do not contribute 
any additional information. The capital gains coefficients 
2 
are always insignificant and the R does not change when 
capital gains are added to the yield on land and the yield 
on competitive assets as independent variables. 
The competitive asset yield coefficient over the 1939-
1952 period is very similar to the results reported over the 
1952-1970 period. Once again the coefficient falls in the 
range -7.0 to -10.0 and is usually very close to -8.0. And, 
like the results of the latter period, the D/P coefficient 
is always significant at the 1 percent confidence level with 
a mean elasticity of about -0.40 in the full model. 
Table 3.10. Ordinary least-squares regression oft 
P = f ^t-1' ^ t-2' 1939-70 
Independent Variables^ 
Equation Constant GFYt-l CGt CGt_l CGt-2 
3.10.1 -34.622 4.317 
(17.355)** 
3.10.2 223.83 
3.10.3 -33.294 4.161 
(12.038)** 
0.661 
(0.658) 
3.10.4 -34.604 4.272 
(10.075)** 
0.741 
(0.717) 
-0.506 
(-0.455) 
3.10.5 22.197 3.714 
(9.640)** 
0.401 
(0.464) 
-0.344 
(-0.372) 
3.10.6 23.169 3.645 
(7.853)** 
0.453 
(0.504) 
-0.384 
(-0.404) 
0.259 
(0.276) 
Table 3.11 Ordinary least-squares regression of: 
P = f (GFY*, CG^/ CGt-2^ 1939-70 
Independent Variables a 
Equation Constant GFY* CGt CGt-1 CGt_2 
3.11.1 -37.802 4.421 
(19.366)** 
3.11.2 15.048 3.855 
(16.008)** 
3.11.3 -36.291 4.242 
(13.629)** 
0.754 
(0.847) 
3.11.4 -37.260 4.324 
(11.398)** 
0.825 
(0.894) 
-0.383 
(-0.388) 
3.11.5 14.346 3.800 
(10.893)** 
0.528 
(0.680) 
-0.223 
(-0.276) 
3.11.6 14.062 3.818 
(8.954)** 
0.515 
(0.637) 
-0.217 
(-0.255) 
-0.065 
(-0.075) 
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D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P-w.r.t. 
%/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t. 
GFYt_l 
R2 Durbin-
Watson d 
1.364 0.910 0.326 
-29.129 
(-5.640)** 
-1.351 0.514 0.312 
1.314 0.911 0.346 
1.349 0.911 0.365 
-8.846 
(-3.591)** 
-0.410 1.173 0.911 0.555 
-8.883 
(-3.637)** 
-0.412 1.151 0.941 0.555 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t 
D/P 
Mean 
Elasticity 
P w.r.t 
GFY* 
Durbin-
Watson d 
1.397 0.926 0.129 
-8.111 
(-3.811)** 
—0.375 1.218 0.951 0,366 
1.341 0.928 0.113 
1.367 0.928 0.123 
-7.942 
(-3.610)** 
—0.368 1.201 0.952 0.330 
-7.928 
(-3.526)** 
-0.368 1.208 0.952 0.329 
Table 3.12. Ordinary least-squares regression of: P=f(GFY*, CG*, D/Pl^ggg 
Independent Variables' 
Eq. Constant GFY* CG* D/P 
Mean Mean 
Elasticity Elasticity 
P w.r.t. P w.r.t. 
D/P GFY* 
Durbin-
Watson d 
3.12.1 -37.427 4.386 0.141 
(9.652)** (0.090) 
1.386 0.926 0.128 
3.12.2 15.674 3.799 0.221 -8.116 
(9.302)** (0.169) (-3.749)** 
-0.377 1.201 0.951 0.363 
Table 3.13. Ordinary least-squares regression of; InP= f[ln(Y+CG)/ In RJiggg 70 
Independent variables' 
Eq. Constant In In In In In D/P R" 
(GFy^_^+CG^) (GFY^ ^-ICG*) (GFY*+CG^) (GFY*+CG*) 
Dur bin-
Watson 
d 
3.13.1 -0.554 0.870 
(-1.425)(10.797)** 
-0.622 0.903 0.526 
(-4.203)** 
3.13.2 -0.525 
(-1.455) 
0.885 
(11.826)** 
-0.714 0.916 0.458 
(-4.337)** 0.916 0.458 
3.13.3 -0.598 
(-1.453) 
0.917 
(11.576)** 
-0.582 0.912 0.438 
(-4.122)** 
3.13.4 -0.570 
(-1.673) 
0.927 -0.564 0.925 0.408 
(12.675)** (-4.301)** 
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2 The R for regressions over the 1939-1970 period are 
a bit lower, at about 0.945, than those of the latter years. 
2 2 This lower R reflects the poorer R over the years 1939-
1952. 
The Durbin-Watson d statistic indicates autocorrelated 
errors over the full period. 
Table 3.13 indicates that the yield elasticity of the 
price of farm land is, like the 1952-1970 results, very 
close to the expected value of 1.0 falling always in the 
range 0.85 to 0.93. Secondly, a t-test fails to reject 
the hypothesis that the yield elasticity, is equal to 
1.0. 
The elasticity of the price of farm real estate with 
respect to D/P has the expected negative sign in all cases 
and has the correct magnitude, -0.55 to -0.71, to suggest 
a significant degree of land-equity substitution over the 
1939-1970 period. 
Finally, the constant term a^, is not significantly 
different from the expected value of zero, again indicating 
a land-equity substitution. 
To test for a change in the structure of the demand 
for farm real estate over the two periods, 1939-1952 and 
1952-1970, a test for the constancy of regression coef­
ficients (Chow, 1960) was conducted (see Table 3.14). 
This test rejected, in all cases tested, the hypothesis 
Table 3,14. Chow test for constancy of regression coefficients 1939-52 and 1952-70 
Equation Number Error Sum Squrres ^^'^39_70~^^®39-52"^^^52-70'^^^ 
1939-52 1952-70 1939-70 1939-52 1953-70 1939-70 ^^®39-52'*'®^^52-70'^""^^ 
3.6.6 3.3.6 3.10.6 283.33 585.05 4158.20 4.42** 
3.7.6 3.4.6 3.11.6 175.26 175.45 3434.20 10.26** 
3.9.1 3.5.1 3.13.1 0.250 0.090 0.927 6.53** 
CM CO 3.5.2 3.13.2 0.189 0.057 0.799 8.36** 
3.9.3 3.5.3 3.13.3 0.218 0.060 0.828 7.67** 
3.9.4 3.5.4 3.13.4 0.164 0.036 0.711 9.44** 
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that the regressions over 1939-1952 and the same regres­
sions over 1952-1970 were estimates of a common relation. 
Table 3.14 shows the results of the Chow tests conducted 
on full model equations. The lowest F-statistic tabulated 
is 4.42 while the critical F-value for all tests in Table 
3.14 is 2.53. 
One possible reason for the different regression co­
efficients in the two periods reported is that the true 
relation was disturbed by the war in the earlier period. 
The observed residuals from the regressions in the earlier 
period were, in fact, quite large and negative for the war 
years, indicating that the price of farm land did not in­
crease as much as expected during World War II. Several 
reasons for this could be advanced: the fear of another 
land boom followed by a market collapse similar to the ex­
perience of World War I, or a patriotic preference for 
government bonds as an investment.^ 
In light of these findings and in defense of the earlier 
results, the war years were omitted from the observations, 
and the model was tested again. These results are reported 
in Table 3.15. These results show essentially no change 
over earlier results which included the war years. The 
^The reader is referred to Murray, 1944; and Regan and 
Clarenbach, 1942, for a review of the farm real estate market 
conditions surrounding the war years. 
Table 3.15. Regression results without 1942-1945 P = f(GFY. D/P) and 
In P = fdnGFY, InD/P) 
1939-52 1952-70 1939-70 
Constant 6.747 2.411 -5.088 0.928 34.719 2.411 
GFY. , 2.081 4.609 3.586 
(9.6 ** (16.646)** (13.606)** 
D/P 0.601 -9.904 -10.579)** 
(0.273) (-4.325)** (-4.661)** 
InGFY 0.806 1.235 0.898 
(9.362)** (12.754)** (20.694)** 
InD/P -0.483 -0.428 -0.640 
(-1.891) (-4.950)** (-8.714)** 
0.940 0.935 0.970 0.962 0.943 0.972 
Durbin-
Watson d 0.80 1.67 1.57 1.48 1.15 1.33 
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land yield variable is always significant at the 1 percent 
confidence level, and the yield elasticity of the price of 
farm real estate is not significantly different from 1.0. 
The competitive asset coefficient is negative, as expected, 
and highly significant in the latter period as well as the 
entire 1939-1970 period, but again, the yield coefficient 
is insignificant for the 1939-1952 period. The elasticity 
of the price of farm real estate is again highly signifi­
cant and possesses the expected negative sign in the lat­
ter period and over the entire period but is again insig­
nificant in the earlier period, 1939-1952. In the latter 
years, 1952-1970, and over the total period, the elasticity 
of the price of farm land with respect to D/P is again not sig­
nificantly different from -1.0 by a t-test. 
In total, these results suggest that while the yield 
on farm real estate has always been a significant variable 
in the determination of farm real estate prices, the ad­
ditional value, in predicting farm land prices, of the 
return on coit^etitive assets has increased over time. In 
the post-war period, the competitive asset influence has 
been sufficiently strong to dominate the results of the 
entire period under study to show, in fact, a significant 
degree of competition between farm real estate and corporate 
equities over the period 1939-1970. 
These findings support a protfolio hypothesis of the 
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determination of the denand for farm real estate. But 
further, these findings suggest that the applicability of 
a portfolio analysis has increased over time as investors 
view farm real estate as an alternative to other forms of 
investment. 
Model II 
Model II was restated for testing purposes with the 
price of farm real estate as the dependent variable. In 
linear form, the reduced form is 
= ®o + + ®2 f + ®3 ^  ^ ®5 T 
+ QGGFY (3.4) 
where 
is the GNP in constant dollars 
M® 
is the real monetary base, because we define the 
private economy inclusive of the banking systan; 
^ is the GNP price deflator; 
APT 
-5— is the rate of increase in the price of farm real 
L 
estate; 
B®P, 
—p— is the real stock of federal government debt 
held in the private economy, i.e., inclusive of 
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cOTtimercial bank and state and local government 
holdings but exclusive of U.S. government and 
Federal Reserve holdings; and 
GFY iS/ as before, the gross farm income per acre of 
farm real estate. 
We should, of course, have an independent variable for the 
real value of the stock of capital 
This variable, however, is almost impossible to measure, 
but it should be highly correlated with Y. Finally, we 
note that when the model is stated with as the dependent 
variable, the expected signs of the coefficients are in­
determinate for all variables except 0^ and whose signs 
should be positive. 
The regression results for Equation 3.4 are reported 
in Table 3.16. Five of the six independent variable co­
efficients were significantly different from zero: 
Of these, one sign was incorrect and significant at the 5 
percent confidence level 
APT. 
GFY , , Y P 
b 
Table 3,16. Land as a proxy for capital 
_ _ Independent Variables^ « 
Depend- R2 Durbln-
aib f ^ ^ "VP ^ "'T 
IJ 
3.16.1 P_ -41.23 0.52 -0.19 -0.50 0.16 1.66 -0.18 0.99 1.07 
^ (2.19)** (-1.53) (-1.84)* (6.05)** (3.14)* (-3.90)** 
3.16.2 0.46 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.009 0.79 0.56 
(1.27) (1.04) (-2.22)* (-1.44) (3.86)* 
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and one sign was definitely correct by a priori expecta­
tions and significant at the 1 percent confidence level 
(GFY). The other signs were, as previously noted, in-
2 determinate. The R was very high at 0.99 but the Durbin-
Watson d indicated autocorrelation. 
The model was then respecified with using GFY*/P^ as 
the dependent variable in which case only one sign, for 
had a definite a priori expectation. This coefficient was 
positive, as expected, but not significantly different from 
zero. This specification showed only two variables, 
B^p 
Y and —^ , 
2 to be significant with a much lower R (0.79) and serious 
autocorrelation. 
The results, then, were less than rewarding. The only 
explanation offered here for the poor performance of the 
model is that it was, perhaps, too heroic to expect the 
relations to be strong enough to make themselves evident 
in such a simple model. 
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CHAPTER IV. SUMMARY Aim CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study clearly show that the demand 
for farm real estate has undergone a structural change since 
the pre-World War II years. While the demand for land has 
always been responsive to the yield on land, its responsive­
ness to the yield on competing assets appears to be confined 
to the post-war period. Thus we conclude that farm real 
estate may currently, but not previously, be viewed as a 
portfolio type asset which competes with other investment-
type assets, namely equities, in the consumer-investors' 
portfolio. Clearly, as the return on equities increases, 
investors are induced, at the margin, out of farm real estate 
and into equities, causing a reduction in the demand for 
farm real estate, and correspondingly, a reduction in the 
price of farm real estate. We should expect that just as 
land has become more competitive with other forms of invest­
ments in the post-war period, it will become even more com­
petitive as nonoperator investors purchase farm land. In­
deed, the rise of corporate farming, through increasing the 
divisibility of land holdings, will make the farm real estate-
equities substitution nearly perfect. 
The importance of this finding for monetary purposes is 
to suggest, again, that the responses monetary changes are 
not confined to a narrowly defined group of financial assets. 
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but rather, the return to equilibrium calls for adjustments 
in the markets for real assets as well. That is, the counter­
part to holding fewer bonds and/or equities is not neces­
sarily to hold more money, but rather to hold other real 
assets as well. This finding, of course, also suggests the 
applicability of portfolio analyses for the estimation of 
demands for other assets too. 
This report does not support the use of farm real estate 
as a proxy for capital in general-equilibrium macroeconomic 
models, but neither does it subtract from the appropriateness 
of such a substitution. Rather, the conclusion to be reached 
here is a call for further research under more tightly spec­
ified econometric models and precision data. The success 
of such a model will likely depend upon the accuracy of 
specification of expectations formulation in the model. 
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APPENDIX. SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
$RY is the dollar residual yield per acre of farm real 
estate, computed as net income of farm operators (including 
inventory changes, cash wages and prerequisites furnished 
to hired labor, interest on farm mortgage and nonreal estate 
debts) minus imputed returns to farm production labor, non-
real estate capital, and operator's management. The return 
imputed to farm production labor was the average cash wage 
rate per hour times the estimated total man-hours required 
for production and overhead. The allowance for nonreal 
estate capital includes actual interest and service charges 
paid plus an interest allowance on equity investment in 
machinery, livestock, feed in store, and working capital. 
The allowance for operators' management represents five per­
cent of the annual value of cash receipts and government pay­
ments. $RY was taken from the Agricultural Finance Review 
of January, 1972. 
sfp 
—p— is the total public debt securities (par values) 
held by private investors; where private investors includes 
individuals, state and local governments, commercial banks, 
mutual savings banks, insurance companies, and other cor­
porations. This series was taken from The Economic Report 
of the President, 1972. 
Y is total gross national product of the U.S. in 1958 
75 
dollars/ and is the implicit price deflator for GNP. 
These series were also taken frcm The Economic Report of 
the President, 1972. 
«S 
is the monetary base taken from the Data Bank 
Retrieval System. 
D/P is the dividend to price ratio of Standard and 
Poor's corporate series of 500 common stocks. This series 
was taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1939 to 1972. 
P^ and GFY were taken from Agricultural Statistics 
1939-1972. Pj^ is the average value per acre of farm real 
estate, and GFY is total gross farm income inclusive of 
government payments, home consumption, imputed rent, and 
changes in inventory. 
